Wednesday, July 13, 2005
Water Governance, Conflict and Social Justice
The following text is my dissertation submitted (3/Sep/2004) as a requirement for the MSc in the Development and Planning: Urban Development Planning, University of London, University College London.
This work was supervised by Professor Esteban Castro, PhD
El texto que se presenta a continuación es la tesis que presenté para obtener el grado de Maestra en Ciencias por la Universidad de Londres. Desafortunadamente, este texto sólo está disponible en inglés.
This work was supervised by Professor Esteban Castro, PhD
El texto que se presenta a continuación es la tesis que presenté para obtener el grado de Maestra en Ciencias por la Universidad de Londres. Desafortunadamente, este texto sólo está disponible en inglés.
Labels: Agua cd. de México
Table of Contents
Acronyms
Introduction
Part 1. Theoretical Framework
Governance
Governance and Conflict
Conflict and Scarcity
Water governance: the roles of different actors
The role of the public sector
The role of the private sector
The role of organised civil society
Social justice in water distribution and management
Part 2. Water in Mexico City
Water governance in Mexico City
Public sector
Private sector
Organised civil society
Social injustice in water issues in Mexico City
Distribution and availability
Distribution and quality
Affordability and price differences
Conclusions
References
Introduction
Part 1. Theoretical Framework
Governance
Governance and Conflict
Conflict and Scarcity
Water governance: the roles of different actors
The role of the public sector
The role of the private sector
The role of organised civil society
Social justice in water distribution and management
Part 2. Water in Mexico City
Water governance in Mexico City
Public sector
Private sector
Organised civil society
Social injustice in water issues in Mexico City
Distribution and availability
Distribution and quality
Affordability and price differences
Conclusions
References
Acronyms
ALDF - Asamblea del Distrito Federal / Legislative Assembly of the Federal District
CADF - Comisión de Aguas del Distrito Federal / Water Commission of the Federal District
CNA - Comisión Nacional del Agua / National Water Commission
DF - Distrito Federal / Federal District
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INEGI - Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática / National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics
PRD - Partido de la Revolución Democrática / Democratic Revolution Party
PRI - Partido Revolucionario Institucional / Institutional Revolutionary Party
PSP - Private Sector Participation
SACM - Sistema de Aguas de la Ciudad de México / Water System of Mexico City
DGCOH - Dirección General de Construcción y Recursos Hidráulicos / General Direction of Hydraulic Construction
SARH - Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos / Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
SEMARNAT - Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales / Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
WB - World Bank
CADF - Comisión de Aguas del Distrito Federal / Water Commission of the Federal District
CNA - Comisión Nacional del Agua / National Water Commission
DF - Distrito Federal / Federal District
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INEGI - Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática / National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics
PRD - Partido de la Revolución Democrática / Democratic Revolution Party
PRI - Partido Revolucionario Institucional / Institutional Revolutionary Party
PSP - Private Sector Participation
SACM - Sistema de Aguas de la Ciudad de México / Water System of Mexico City
DGCOH - Dirección General de Construcción y Recursos Hidráulicos / General Direction of Hydraulic Construction
SARH - Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos / Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
SEMARNAT - Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales / Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
WB - World Bank
Introduction
Claudia Campero Arena
The alarming figures of 1.1 billion people lacking access to safe drinking water and 2.4 billion lacking reasonable access to improved sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2000) are repeated again and again in publications that address the ‘water crisis’ we are facing. The explanations for this crisis are somewhat concentrated on natural, technological and financial reasons, sometimes ignoring that political and socioeconomic reasons play a chief part in the problem. The consequences that the deficiencies of these services have on people’s lives are multidimensional because not only their health is affected, but also their livelihoods and overall development. Rising population, urbanization and per capita consumption of water show how the stress on the resource is increasing. Yet these figures need to be contextualised to see the differences between and within geographical regions. While in some places people take water for granted, in others people suffer a daily struggle for water.
This work attempts to address the differences concerning water service within Mexico City. The basic assumption is that problems in the governance system, where the government and the private sector dominate the decision-making process to the disadvantage of a wide sector of the population, are to a certain extent responsible for the socially unjust distribution and management of water. This injustice experienced by some parts of the city turn into conflicts that evidence the governance failure.
The two key questions that guide the discussion are:
How far is the water governance system in Mexico City responsible for a socially unjust distribution and management of the resource? How can civil struggle or conflict help to change governance systems to achieve more socially just results?
To address these questions, the followed methodology takes briefly into consideration some theoretical debates regarding the concepts used in this work. For this purpose literature concerning governance, water governance, conflict and social justice was studied. Also some examples to back the general arguments in the theoretical discussion were included. Next the recent historical background of water provision and governance in Mexico City was examined. Then specific examples of the water governance conflicts and water injustices in the city in recent years were chosen. These examples where found through a variety of sources including specialised literature, newspapers and personal interviews with people highly involved in the sector.
Unfortunately due to information and time constrains this methodology needs more systematization. The different examples of Mexico City to back the argument are drawn from different areas of the city and in different dates. Whether water conflicts have increased or decreased in recent years cannot be precisely defined using this methodology. What can be said is that they are still present and affect a substantial portion of the city’s population.
This work is divided in two sections. The first part, the theoretical framework, introduces the key concepts and debates that will be needed in the discussion of the case of Mexico City. Not only will concept definitions be tackled but an attempt to see the interactions among the different concepts will be made. Thus how governance systems may help to solve but also trigger conflicts will be examined. In addition, how governance systems may undermine or promote social justice is also discussed.
The second part is about water governance and social justice in water services in Mexico City. It starts with an overview of the water authorities at the federal and local levels, how they are organised and what their main problems are. Then the introduction of private participation in the sector and its consequences is addressed. Subsequently the role of the civil society is explored in two dimensions: their participation in the organisations created by the federal authority, contrasted with their ways of organising and demanding attention from the authorities to address their needs. Here we find that conflict plays an important role to obtain the attention of officials that might turn into negotiations for solutions.
Further on various recent examples drawn from the city are given to explore the social injustice of water distribution in the city. Issues of availability, quality and affordability are analysed to prove the inequalities present in the water service in the city. Finally a brief exploration on how the conflicts generated by these inequalities have already had an impact on the local government and parliament is addressed.
A last observation before entering the discussion: conflict is a central theme in this work. This is not to disregard the great importance of cooperation among different actors in addressing water management. But underlying these efforts of cooperation there are conflictive interests that need to be acknowledged. Furthermore when water distribution inequalities are dismissed as financially, technically or naturally conditioned and there is no engagement in dialog and negotiation, cooperation becomes a distant possibility and conflict takes over. I consider this to be the case in Mexico City at present.
The alarming figures of 1.1 billion people lacking access to safe drinking water and 2.4 billion lacking reasonable access to improved sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2000) are repeated again and again in publications that address the ‘water crisis’ we are facing. The explanations for this crisis are somewhat concentrated on natural, technological and financial reasons, sometimes ignoring that political and socioeconomic reasons play a chief part in the problem. The consequences that the deficiencies of these services have on people’s lives are multidimensional because not only their health is affected, but also their livelihoods and overall development. Rising population, urbanization and per capita consumption of water show how the stress on the resource is increasing. Yet these figures need to be contextualised to see the differences between and within geographical regions. While in some places people take water for granted, in others people suffer a daily struggle for water.
This work attempts to address the differences concerning water service within Mexico City. The basic assumption is that problems in the governance system, where the government and the private sector dominate the decision-making process to the disadvantage of a wide sector of the population, are to a certain extent responsible for the socially unjust distribution and management of water. This injustice experienced by some parts of the city turn into conflicts that evidence the governance failure.
The two key questions that guide the discussion are:
How far is the water governance system in Mexico City responsible for a socially unjust distribution and management of the resource? How can civil struggle or conflict help to change governance systems to achieve more socially just results?
To address these questions, the followed methodology takes briefly into consideration some theoretical debates regarding the concepts used in this work. For this purpose literature concerning governance, water governance, conflict and social justice was studied. Also some examples to back the general arguments in the theoretical discussion were included. Next the recent historical background of water provision and governance in Mexico City was examined. Then specific examples of the water governance conflicts and water injustices in the city in recent years were chosen. These examples where found through a variety of sources including specialised literature, newspapers and personal interviews with people highly involved in the sector.
Unfortunately due to information and time constrains this methodology needs more systematization. The different examples of Mexico City to back the argument are drawn from different areas of the city and in different dates. Whether water conflicts have increased or decreased in recent years cannot be precisely defined using this methodology. What can be said is that they are still present and affect a substantial portion of the city’s population.
This work is divided in two sections. The first part, the theoretical framework, introduces the key concepts and debates that will be needed in the discussion of the case of Mexico City. Not only will concept definitions be tackled but an attempt to see the interactions among the different concepts will be made. Thus how governance systems may help to solve but also trigger conflicts will be examined. In addition, how governance systems may undermine or promote social justice is also discussed.
The second part is about water governance and social justice in water services in Mexico City. It starts with an overview of the water authorities at the federal and local levels, how they are organised and what their main problems are. Then the introduction of private participation in the sector and its consequences is addressed. Subsequently the role of the civil society is explored in two dimensions: their participation in the organisations created by the federal authority, contrasted with their ways of organising and demanding attention from the authorities to address their needs. Here we find that conflict plays an important role to obtain the attention of officials that might turn into negotiations for solutions.
Further on various recent examples drawn from the city are given to explore the social injustice of water distribution in the city. Issues of availability, quality and affordability are analysed to prove the inequalities present in the water service in the city. Finally a brief exploration on how the conflicts generated by these inequalities have already had an impact on the local government and parliament is addressed.
A last observation before entering the discussion: conflict is a central theme in this work. This is not to disregard the great importance of cooperation among different actors in addressing water management. But underlying these efforts of cooperation there are conflictive interests that need to be acknowledged. Furthermore when water distribution inequalities are dismissed as financially, technically or naturally conditioned and there is no engagement in dialog and negotiation, cooperation becomes a distant possibility and conflict takes over. I consider this to be the case in Mexico City at present.
Part 1. Theoretical Framework
Claudia Campero-Arena
In order to answer the questions posed in the introduction, first governance as it will be understood in this work will be defined. Subsequently the links between governance and social justice will be drawn. Then we will explore how governance systems particularly in the water sector can foster or solve social conflicts. Subsequently the roles that different agents – government, private sector and civil society – of governance play in the processes for water distribution and management in a large metropolis will be analysed.
Next the problems in the water sector concerning social justice will be addressed. For this purpose different ways in which a socially just distribution of water may be affected will be identified, referring to issues of unequal availability, quality and affordability. Finally the likelihood of a more socially just distribution as an outcome of conflict and struggle, particularly through citizens organisation to contest the authority in a variety of ways from civil disobedience to mass demonstrations or road blockages, will be discussed.
Governance
In the following paragraphs the meaning of governance will explored. This is central to the subsequent discussion on the roles different actors play in how water is allocated in a city. In turn, understanding the governance systems and the power relations within them can help to understand how social justice problems arise. Further the fact that governance systems change and how different actors – with frequently competing interests – may be involved in this process is pertinent to the discussion of conflicts around water issues.
Governance is defined in very different ways. For some, it is the articulation of different levels of government: local, regional and national. For instance, Asmal (1998) makes reference to South Africa’s constitution viewpoint of the concept – without mentioning civil society – and notes that governance ‘requires all spheres of government, national, provincial and local and all organs of State, to cooperate with each other in mutual trust and good faith by coordinating their actions and legislation with each other’ (p. 98). Yet ongoing research about how governance systems actually work shows that in addition to the traditional forms of government, governance is also the result of the articulation of the power relations among the government, the market and the civil society. This is closer to the way the term will be used in what follows.
A useful definition of governance that will be used in this work is that given by Healey (1997). According to her, ‘the systems of governance of a society or community refer to the processes through which collective affairs are managed. Governance involves the articulation of rules of behaviour with respect to the collective affairs of a political community; and of principles for allocating resources among the community members’ (p. 206).
Healey’s understanding of governance introduces several issues. To begin with, the idea of governance as a process that necessarily involves historic change in the way affairs are viewed and dealt with. Next it draws the relation between governance and institutions – commonly considered as ‘the rules of the game’ (DFID, 2003). Thus the way governance works will define how the rules will be established. More importantly it will also define who is involved in the formulation of these rules. Here the link between governance and social justice arises. As Iris Young argues, social justice is not only defined in terms of distribution but related to the realisation of two values: ‘(1) developing and exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s experience, and (2) participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s action’ (1990: 37). Thus, a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for a process to be socially just would be that the system of governance acknowledges and enables people to exercise the right to be involved in deciding those things that are important to their lives. Clearly water is an issue of primary importance for sustaining life and maintaining health, improving life quality and economic development. Indeed, 2.2 billion people lack the amount of water required to satisfy only basic domestic needs, which is estimated by Gleick in 50 litres per capita daily (cited in Schmandt, 2004), but defining what basic consumption is becomes controversial.
Thus governance refers to how different actors in a society interact to formulate the rules of behaviour that determine, among other things, resource allocation. This interaction is necessarily affected by unequal power relations among the different actors. Nevertheless it is important to bear in mind that none of the three main actors (public sector, private sector and civil society) are monolithic. There are different interests within each which make understanding governance systems ever more complex.
Considering the above discussion, how the water resources are allocated will be determined by the governance system. This system may be the result of a wide involvement of community members, but it often is the result of a few powerful interest groups that can impose what is convenient to them on other sectors of the population. Thus how socially just the process of water allocation and management is will be a result to some extent of how the system of governance works and the power balances it manifests. This is because the governance system is a result of the complex political, cultural, historical, spatial, economic and social processes in a society which involve unequal power relations.
Governance and Conflict
Another definition of governance makes us aware of the role it plays in conflict. ‘The concept of governance refers to the complex set of values, norms, processes, and institutions by which society manages its development and resolves conflict, formally and informally’ (Uitto, 1997). This means that one of the main features of a good governance system is that it should aid in conflict resolution in a society.
However there are different degrees of conflict and various manifestations of its presence. Warner (2000) mentions that a conflict may be: ‘a debate or contest; a disagreement, argument, dispute or quarrel; a struggle, battle or confrontation; or a state of unrest, turmoil or chaos’ (p. 14). Accordingly each type of conflict would then need different strategies that lead to a resolution. Furthermore if the governance system allows for adequate channels of communication for conflict resolution the likelihood of escalation and its undesirable consequences would be reduced.
Here it becomes necessary to be aware of the important role of conflict in the reconfiguration of power relations. Conflict is commonly perceived as negative, something to be avoided. Yet conflict is necessary to change the balance of power relations. As Crawley (1998) expresses in the context of participation ‘where participatory approaches do not give rise to conflict, they are failing to challenge existing power relations and therefore cannot claim to empower’ (p.31).
Different levels of governance address different scales of conflict – international, national, regional or local. This does not mean that a conflict at one scale is independent from others. Hence the articulation and interaction of the different levels of governance in order to resolve a conflict are indispensable. For instance, a conflict between two nations that share a river must be resolved through dialog between them and most likely a treaty. Simultaneously, the population affected by the dispute must have local systems of governance that allow them to participate in the debate for the resolution. Thus the need for articulation among the local and the national or international level becomes evident.
It is important to bear in mind that sometimes social conflicts do not end in fulfilling the aims of those who are in a disadvantaged situation and do bring substantial hardship. We need to learn how to transform conflict into a positive outcome. This will only be possible when the view towards conflict is changed. Warner (2000) in this sense argues ‘conflict should be seen as an expression of changing society…not something that can be avoided or suppressed. It needs to be acknowledged, managed and transformed into a force for positive social change’ (p. 14). It is only through dialog and negotiation that the different stakeholders can reach lasting and effective solutions. When mechanisms to resolve conflict that are coherent with the cultural and political context are in place and functioning, we might be getting closer to good governance.
In the case of water, due to its vital character, communities have cooperated as well as fought to manage, distribute and control it. Water conflicts have taken place at all the scales of conflict from international to local. Although much attention is given to international conflicts, Ohlsson (2000) argues ‘that the risk of conflicts within countries in fact is larger, and that the risk of international conflict is derived from the necessity to avoid what is defined as second-order conflicts within countries, caused not by water scarcity itself, but by the institutional change required to adapt to water scarcity’ (p. 213).
Conflict and Scarcity
Scarcity is now brought to our attention because it is commonly considered that the problem of availability of the resource is the root of the conflict. Bennett (1995) makes us aware of how the power issues become important at this point:
‘When there isn’t enough water for all users to consume as much as they want, then water services become an embodiment of the social structure and the social dynamic of the city. Planners and other decision makers decide who gets water and when, and their decisions may reflect the power and relationships of different groups of water users’ (p. 19)
Normally these allocations tend to favour the most politically and economically powerful, and lead to great injustices for the poor. While this remains true, the cause of scarcity is to be questioned too. Scarcity arises because water is not an endless resource, but it is constructed socially. For instance, Ohlsson (2000) talks about the scarcity of social resources to deal with water scarcity. In the specific case of Mexico City, Castro (2003) makes reference to the paradox of scarcity in the city while the provision of water is much above the international recommendations. Furthermore, Swyngedouw et al (2002) warn us how the discourse of scarcity has been instrumental for those aiming to promote the view of water as a commodity, not as a public or social good.
Water provision has become ever more difficult because of the increasing population and per capita demand (Uitto, 1997). Although some conservation progress for reducing water consumption has occurred, this has not halted the rise of per capita consumption due to increasing urbanisation and living standards that make more water consumption possible. Indeed the amount of water available, as well as the way it is available, becomes an issue of quality of life, but is highly related to habits. There is an urgent need for changing policy that tries to manage the supply side for a more sustainable policy that manages the demand, among other things this would mean to change people’s consumption habits. This may not be simple to achieve because the same policies that try to improve access to water – for instance, by increasing in-house connections – increase consumption and stress on the resource. Naturally, a person that has to walk long distances for water will be more careful when using it than a person that only needs to turn the tap. There is no easy answer to this problem.
As scarcity increases so does the competition among different actors according to the use they give to water. In the most general classification, humans use water for two main purposes: for personal use (physical survival and hygiene) and as an input to the production process. Another use of water that is more general to all living things is as part of the ecosystem. In spite of its importance, this last use is not always considered because it is not directly seen as an impact on human beings. Yet increasingly it has been made clear that water extracted from the environment, especially when great volumes are extracted, will create an impact on the flora and fauna and ultimately in the human populations living in the area probably bringing disasters and hardship.
The conflicts generated between actors that give different uses to water are naturally affected by the power they have in a system. It is not uncommon that industries and other important businesses, like hotels, have a more reliable service than households in the vicinity. Considering the competition between domestic and industrial uses, Bennett (1995) gives a detailed explanation of how this created conflict and a water crisis in Monterrey, Mexico in the 1980s.
Governance systems need to address these conflicts. This means proper channels of communication to enable dialog. In order for this dialog to take place, these channels must be trusted by people and acknowledged as adequate for achieving change. Furthermore, bearing in mind that citizens have different ways of showing their dissatisfaction for a service is also necessary. For instance, citizens may use institutional procedures to complain, but when these fail to bring the expected results, citizens often turn to civil disobedience. Governments and government officials should be prepared to expect not only those manifestations which they consider adequate as ‘good citizenship’ (Ward, 1986). Governance systems allowing for conflict manifestation, but also allowing mechanisms for conflict resolution through negotiation and, if possible, consensus building, will be more likely to arrive at more socially just distributions and management of resources than those that dismiss or even repress any kind of complaint that fails to follow institutional procedures.
Water governance: the roles of different actors
According to the UNDP, water governance ‘encompasses the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which governments, civil society, and the private sector make decisions about how best to use, develop and manage water resources’ (2004:10). Although this notion of water governance may seem consensual in the mainstream discourse, it is important to bear in mind that this definition contains concepts such as ‘civil society’ which are defined differently by opposing traditions of thought changing considerably what is understood by ‘governance’ (Castro, 2004).
During the 1980s governments around the globe had to cut spending in order to reduce their budgetary deficits. In the developed world, the combined effect of the end of the convertibility of the dollar to gold and the oil crisis brought an economic recession with high inflation (Midgley, 1997). Governments responded cutting social spending and promoting privatisation. This crisis explains the rebirth of liberal thinking aiming to reduce government interference with the market. The developing countries due to the debt crisis were forced to undertake structural adjustment policies supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure loans. Structural adjustment policies urged governments to undertake macro-economic reforms to encourage private sector development (Wratten, 1995). These policies supported the privatisation of the publicly owned industries (Canak and Swanson, 1998), including utilities.
Contrary to the experience in the developed countries, the governments of the developing countries had not achieved universal coverage in social services (including water). Inefficiency, lack of funding and political unwillingness all combined to make basic service provision something that only some enjoyed. Increasing urbanisation made the service provision gaps more evident in the growing cities and they had to be filled somehow. The most common reaction, promoted and imposed by the international funding agencies, was to consider that the market would, with its competitiveness nature, be a better service provider for the general population than the highly centralised and bureaucratic governments. Although this is still what some believe, many are more sceptical of what the market can achieve in particular for the poor (Barlow and Clarke, 2002 and Ward, 1997). Even the WB admits that private participation has had problems in reaching the poor (WB, 2004). In this context the interrelationships – and specifically the power relations – of the three agents: government, private sector and civil society have become ever more relevant to the service provision and, in general, the development of communities.
Whether water provision should be a responsibility of the government on its own, a shared responsibility with the community, a commodity provided by the private sector or a combination of the three is an ongoing debate that is very likely to continue in the years to come. There is no one single correct answer to the question of who should do what in order to have a good water governance system. Yet it is possible to talk about the recent evolution of these roles and their consequences. Furthermore, it is necessary to be aware of what systems have failed to fulfil the water needs and to attempt to understand why.
The role of the public sector
The predominant model of water provision in western cities in the nineteenth century was of a few private companies serving the wealthiest areas. Due to the growing unsanitary conditions generated by the lack of the service in poorer areas, important health problems appeared affecting the poor as well as the wealthy. This motivated the involvement of the state. Since water provision is central for life and life quality, states eventually became concerned for giving this service while not being concerned with cost recovery. In fact subsidies in water provision became widespread.
Large and costly infrastructure was constructed in order to provide this service, especially in the urban areas where the need for water for industries, commerce and labour reproduction was most evident. Although many of these projects were not without problems, particularly of environmental sustainability and sacrificing some communities for others, they provided large cities with water. Interestingly enough, it was the state that could make these large investments, not the private sector.
In Latin America –during the post-war period and to some extent until today – water, as many other services, has been managed on various occasions as a tool for a ‘clientelist-populist’ way of government (Ward, 1997 and Bennett, 1995). Providing water services in a step by step fashion (from the water truck to the common faucet and finally to the house connection) and as a ‘gift’ given by politicians in exchange for votes has been very frequent.
The role of the private sector
Starting the 1980´s, the budgetary deficits in the welfare states became a growing concern. The answer given was through structural adjustment that involved privatisation of many industries and services previously owned by governments. Privatisation came in many forms varying the degree of private or public control and responsibility. Budds and McGranahan (2003) classify the most common forms of private sector participation in this way: service contract, management contract, lease/affermage, concession, BOT-type and divestiture. They are ordered from the one that involves the least participation of the private sector – the service contract, in the case of the Federal District (DF), Mexico – to the one that gives even asset ownership to the private companies called divestiture, in the case of England and Wales.
Swyngedouw et al (2002) identify the consequences of the worldwide shift in the view of water as a commodity: water becomes another product where profit must be maximised; private agencies gain power in the decisions concerning water management to the detriment of wider citizen involvement. Water management becomes part of the global economy where investment decisions taken elsewhere affect the water provision of a city. Indeed, although the need for investment was one of the reasons for private participation to be encouraged, the concessions granted were for the lowest tariff bid, the results turning out to be sacrificing investment to maximise profits (UN-WWAP, 2003).
Another serious problem with privatisation, most acute in developing countries, is the unequal power relations between the water companies and the local governments. Awarding a concession transfers power previously in public hands to private hands. For this reason, regulatory agencies are central to ensure access and quality, particularly for the poor. Yet these agencies are not always put in place. If they are it is frequently difficult for a new agency to be capable of managing such a great task in front of powerful transnationals (Barlow and Clarke, 2002).
Although not all private participation is in transnational corporations’ hands, huge water companies do have a considerable control. The two biggest companies are Suez (previously Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux; ONDEO is the brand name for water operations) and Vivendi Universal. Together they control 70 per cent of the world’s water market and the earnings of this industry are calculated to be 40% of that of the oil sector (Barlow and Clarke, 2002). Considering this it becomes obvious that the power of negotiation and knowledge face to face with a local government can be in favour of these water giants.
The role of organised civil society
Today it is widely accepted that in order to achieve good governance meaningful participation of the different sectors of the population is essential. In this context, participation means involvement in the different stages of policy making including decision-making. In this sense Castro emphasises how the governance system is linked to citizenship rights, giving special importance to the right to participate in the water resources management. ‘This involves, among other issues, the existence of institutions ensuring that the management of water and water services is accountable to the citizenry and subject to democratic control’ (Castro, 2003: 7).
Thus key to the discussion is the issue of accountability. It is not so much the problem of whether water services should be public or private, but that whoever manages this resource can be held accountable to the population. Certainly in order for a private company to be accountable there is a need for a good regulation and proper enforcement to protect the citizen. Nonetheless if the government is the provider there is still a need of having the proper channels for citizen demands to be addressed.
Most governments admit the need for participation but the extent and the ways citizen involvement is permitted varies considerably. Participation often is only considered in implementation stages, which is unsatisfactory for those affected. More participatory models include decision-making powers to representative organisms in such issues as planning and tariff approval (UN-WWAP, 2003). Another common problem to claim participation is that of adequate representation of different actors. Due to water’s importance in all aspects of life, it is only natural that competing interests within the civil society arise. For this reason, adequate representation would mean the possibility to engage in dialog and negotiate together.
In this sense, Castro highlights ‘the prevailing model of water governance continues to alienate and exclude rather than including “civil society” … limiting people’s participation to their role of customers. In this regard, the evidence shows that for the prevailing policy models “participation” often means “willingness” to accept decisions already taken with little or no consultation. These policies are creating an imbalance resulting in the weakening of local governments and civil society structures, which have lost any capacities they had acquired in the past to actually exercise democratic control and regulation’ (Castro, 2004: 27).
Participation has become a fashionable word and the fact that the WB, among others, has it as a prerequisite to approve projects has helped to make it more widespread. Yet the distance between the theory and the practice of how governance frameworks function brings us back to remember that power relations are always at the centre. This means that as long as power in greatly unequal societies remains unmoved, well intentioned regulations that allow for citizen involvement are likely to be unrepresentative and probably fail to achieve more socially just results. Let us now engage on the discussion of social justice in water distribution and management.
Social justice in water distribution and management
Since water is an indispensable element for survival and adequate quality of life, it necessarily becomes strategic. The command over the resource is intrinsically power related. An increase in the power of the private sector in detriment of the civil sector, manifested when the population has no control over the management of the resource, becomes an issue of social justice.
To define social justice is a challenge because there is no consensus of what the term means. David Harvey considers social justice is a set of principles to address conflicts related with social cooperation and individual improvement. He summarises this as ‘a just distribution justly arrived at’ (1988: 98). However Iris Young (1990) argues that social justice is not restrained to distribution but also considers the need of people for expression and participation in their community.
In my view social justice is about the distribution of benefits and responsibilities in a society allowing individuals in that society – regardless of their gender, ideology, ethnicity, ability, age, income or sexual preference – decide upon their future in a participatory and democratic manner that should guarantee an acceptable standard of living. For sure, this definition would be contested by many because the perception of social justice is related to life experiences, beliefs and cultural backgrounds. Nevertheless most of us would agree that having adequate access to water services is an issue of social justice.
When evaluating if the distribution of water is socially just we have to bear in mind not only the availability disparity that different sectors of the population may face. We need to be aware that the complexity is considerable. It is not only about quantity of water. It is about quality, frequency of availability, affordability and equity in the price paid for the resource. Moreover social justice is also about having a say in how the resource is managed: what the priorities are. If the resource is scarce this is even more important. For instance, if the water will be only available at certain times then there must be a negotiation of how these times will be allocated. This also means that the proper channels of communication must be available for the citizens to express their concerns.
Water quality issues, of water for human consumption and of wastewater, are especially a health concern. The number of deaths due to diseases related to inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene are alarming, especially considering that we know about how to prevent them. To give just one example, in 2001, 2 million people died of infectious diarrhoeas, and more than half were children under five (UN-WWAP, 2003). Improving water supply in quantity and quality, sanitation measures, hygiene education and environmental management are all central to improve living conditions and reduce the number of people suffering from these diseases.
The problem of how water is priced is of considerable importance also. It is not only the issue if water is affordable for the population, but what price is paid for what service. The question of affordability is related to what proportion of an income is spent on water and if this allows a family to consume as much water as needed for sanitary and health needs. Naturally a lower income family will spend a higher proportion of their salary on water even when they are paying the same amount as a wealthier family. If this payment affects the capacity of the lower income family to fulfil other basic needs there is an injustice.
Concerning the second issue about what price is paid for what service commonly shows the most insulting injustices. The quality of the service is frequently inversely proportional to the price! Bennett (1995) expresses this by letting us know that ‘poor urban residents in Latin America with the worst water service often pay up to ten times more for their water than wealthy families with the best water services’ (p.22). In the case of Guayaquil, Swyngedouw (1995) explains the terrible situation of people served by tankers who may pay as much as 400 times what people served by the public utility do.
Hence, the issue about the distribution of water involves many things. The most evident is the amount of water available but also important is the frequency of the service, the quality of the water and the service, the way it is available (as a common faucet or an in-house faucet) and the price paid for it. These may all vary according to location. For instance, there are differences between the Federal District (DF) and the State of Mexico , differences within the delegaciones and municipalities of these entities, between the city and the rural areas, and between regular and irregular settlements. These location differences are also much related with variations in income – people in the DF are broadly wealthier and have generally better water services than those in the State of Mexico. Nonetheless, there are considerable differences within the DF which will be addressed further on.
Then the distribution of water service provision varies considerably with space. Generally urban areas are better served than rural areas, and Mexico is no exception. The reason for this is mainly that the dispersion of the population makes it much more expensive to supply rural settlements. Nevertheless, within cities there is also spatial variation in the distribution of the service. In Mexico City Ward notes that areas with significant irregular settlements are more deprived (1986: 90).
Furthermore, differences also become apparent among different users of water: domestic, commercial or industrial. Many industries have the technological and financial capacity to have their own wells and extract water for their production process. These wells are supposed to be metered and the water authority charges the use of this water. Nonetheless, the control becomes difficult for the water authority particularly because the wells are frequently inside the industry’s property. The economic power corporations exercise may ultimately override the rights of other sectors of the population. As mentioned earlier the difference of availability for the industry in Monterrey in the 1980s, sacrificing the lower income population during a drought brought about a furious social response (Bennett, 1995).
In this discussion of the distribution of water services it is important to be aware that the burden of water scarcity is not suffered equally within the household. It is normally women and children who are responsible to fetch water from the common faucets or other sources (Bennett, 1995). The consequences of being responsible for such a task include reduced opportunity for income earning activities, studying or recreation, and permanent skeletal damage for regularly carrying water (UN-WWAP, 2003). This means that above all their participation should be sought when trying to address water issues and improve policy making.
All these possible ways in which the distribution of water is inequitable become a possible source of conflict. According to how widespread and how powerful the actors involved in a conflict are a corresponding response form the authority will take place. At this point we become aware of an important problem: Considering that the power of the actors is central in getting the attention of the authorities to resolve a conflict, it is clear that it might well be that the most marginalized actors may not be heard. The poor in order to have power normally need to be organised. If they are not, they are generally ignored.
When situations turn desperate and the population manages to organise, for example in mass demonstrations or road blockages, the attention of the authorities might be gained. This does not necessarily mean that the problem will be addressed in an integral way. Most commonly fast unarticulated responses are the outcome. Frequently they do not last for long. As Martha Delgado , an independent local parliament member, said in an interview, it is only through demonstrations, road blockages and so on that the authorities pay attention to the citizens’ demands; yet the kind of solutions they give are not for the origin of the problem to be solved but for satisfying the immediate demand (interview with the author, 3/08/04).
A senior official of the water authority in Mexico City, Germán Martínez Santoyo, also considered that the demonstrations and road blockages do not help to arrive at more socially just solutions. He explained that in order to give lasting solutions to citizen demands investment and technology is needed. These infrastructure undertakings should be part of established plans and projects (interview with the author, 23/07/04). Thus if a group of citizens block a road or protest in any other way to call for better water services officials might sit and talk to them but if there is not a particular project for that area already in place, the solution will only be temporary to calm the protesters.
Yet it is difficult to disregard the impact citizen protests can have on policy making. After all if an area is a continuous source of conflict, it will most likely be included when plans and projects are formulated. There are plenty of examples of this process particularly in Latin America (Gilbert, 1998). This may be a long process and will require sustained action from the population to be taken seriously. Moreover it might not bring the desired outcome in the form it was imagined and demanded. Nonetheless it might still be a considerable improvement from the previous situation. In other cases, protesters may sometimes aim and succeed to frustrate plans and projects that they perceive contrary to their interests. Some examples of conflicts and their results in the water sector in Mexico City will be given in the next section.
Bringing things together, water, because of its indispensable character for survival and development, becomes an issue of social justice in the way that it is distributed and in the way it is managed. This in turn creates conflict within the system of governance over what is to happen with the resource.
Part 2. Water in Mexico City
Claudia Campero Arena
When the Spaniards arrived in Tenochtitlan (today Mexico City) they could not believe their eyes. The city was built on lakes. Starting from an island in the middle, the city extended into the lakes and had canals as roads. The Spaniards progressively desiccated the closed basin draining its water to other rivers. What remains of those lakes makes it difficult to picture what that landscape used to be. Paradoxically, what used to be a city built on water is today a city that suffers problems of water availability. But as it will be argued, these problems do not affect all in the same way.
By the 1950s, due to the high demand for the resource, the rate of extraction exceeded the rate of recharge of the ground waters – the source that amounts for the majority of the water of the city – and water started to be pumped from two other exterior rivers (Lerma and Cutzamala rivers) (CNA, 2000: 74). The overexploitation of the ground waters has caused serious problems to many constructions in the city which are literarily sinking due to the nature of the soil of the desiccated lakes. The lowering of the water table amounts to 1 metre annually (Tortajada, 2003: 125) and over extraction of the groundwater is calculated to be higher than 140 per cent (CNA, 2000:75). Additionally the recharge areas have been substantially reduced owing to the urbanisation of the previous forests.
Mexico City’s sprawl has extended beyond the limits of the Federal District (DF) to the State of Mexico. The Metropolitan Area of Mexico’s Valley (ZMVM) is integrated by the 16 delegaciones of the DF, 58 municipalities of the State of Mexico and one of the state of Hidalgo. The municipalities had 9.7 million inhabitants in 2000 and a population growth rate of 2.41. For this same year the Federal District (DF) had 8.6 million and 0.3 growth rate (SEDUVI, 2001). The built-up area of the city is estimated in 1500 km2, however the metropolitan area comprises 4500 km2 (Ward, 1998). There is no metropolitan authority to carry on policies for the city. As it will be explained further on, for water issues other municipalities with the ZMVM form a hydrological region.
The water provision for the metropolitan area was at the beginning of the 1990s 62 cubic meters per second and for the DF approximately of 35 m3/s. This share of water for the DF has remained the same[1] meaning that to respond to growing demand the solution has been leakage control (Martínez Omaña, 2004). The amount of water lost through leakages in the DF in 1997 was 37%; in 2001 it was of 30% (Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004). This is still an expensive inefficiency.
Owing to the nature of Mexico City, being divided into differently organised entities, the DF and the State of Mexico, and for the sake of brevity, some of the following information will only be about the DF. However the fact that a substantial part of the city has sprawled to the State of Mexico and that there are differences in the water service is important and will to some extent be addressed.
Water governance in Mexico City
Considering that governance is the way a society organises its affairs, the way this will be done is related to the perceptions and beliefs prevalent in that society. Water, due to its indispensable character for life, is considered in many societies as a public good, even as ‘sacred’ (Whiteford and Melville, 2002; Shiva, 2002). Not least in the case of Mexico, where the perception of water as a community resource was clearly found in the indigenous Mexicans before the Spanish arrived, in the laws the Spanish brought with them, and was formally established as a public good after the beginning of the twentieth century Revolution and Constitution. Governance systems that perceive water as a public good generally try, at least in principle, to make it available to everybody. Indeed this is the idea of the need to provide universal access to essential services.
Yet in 1992 the legislation was changed. Castro (2003) explains that the process was ‘increasing state control over water resources, while simultaneously transforming the status of water from public to private good, and organizing its governance around market principles’(p.28). The premise was that scarcity problems in Mexico were because water had not been treated as an economic good. The importance of increasing state control was because of the need to regain power over water that was managed by communities so the municipalities would be directly in charge. The municipalities could then involve the private sector in the management of the resource. Since then, private participation in the water sector has increased in several states of the country changing the configuration of the water governance system from one previously dominated by the central government to one where the private sector and the local governments play increasingly an important role. Nevertheless there are important problems in the decentralisation process generating coordination inefficiencies.
In the next paragraphs, the roles of different actors of governance in the water sector in Mexico City will be addressed. Starting by giving a national overview, then the particular case of the Federal District will be introduced. Next the privatisation of water services and some of its consequences in the DF will be briefly tackled. Lastly the role of the organised civil society will be considered.
Public sector
Water management at the federal level
The National Water Commission (CNA) is the federal agency in command of the administration, policy making, custody and allocation of water in Mexico. Created in 1989, this organisation, together with the new law of national waters dictated in 1992, started a new way of management of the resource. It promoted two important things: decentralisation and privatisation (Martínez Omaña, 2004). The CNA is today a deconcentrated organisation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT).
One of the CNA’s most important activities is to supply bulk water to settlements. It is not its responsibility, though, to distribute within the settlements, and in some cases it is the local government that does the extraction of water. For instance, in the DF the water that is extracted from the underground is the responsibility of the local authority, while that brought from external sources is provided by the CNA. The municipalities and the DF are supposed to pay the CNA for the bulk water it provides, but many municipalities are indebted with this federal authority.
Martinez-Lagunes and Rodriguez-Tirado (1998) identify two important problems that this organisation has. Firstly, although one of the reasons for creating the CNA was to concentrate in a single agency water issues and favour co-ordination, this has not been entirely achieved. Secondly, the activities of CNA have created conflicts of interest within. For example, it is at the same time regulator of water quality and responsible for sewage discharge. The aim is to change this giving the CNA a predominantly normative character, yet maintaining technical support for the local authorities (CNA, 2003).
The CNA has organised water management in 13 hydrological regions. This is of considerable importance because it means that instead of managing the resource according to political divisions, it is managed with a logic that aims to be integrated and ecologically sustainable. Also important to sustainability is that finally water is part of the SEMARNAT, not of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) as it used to be. Notwithstanding these changes in the management of water, the goal of achieving environmental sustainability is still very far from being met.
The hydrological region Mexico City belongs to is called the Mexico’s Valley Region. It includes the DF, 56 municipalities of the State of Mexico, 39 of Hidalgo and 4 of Tlaxcala. The most important problems of the region identified in the National Hydraulic Programme (CNA, 2000:75) are: a) the overexploitation of underground waters, calculated as representing 140 per cent of the recharge capacity; b) water pollution; c) insufficient water delivery; d) significant inefficiency in irrigation systems and urban uses; e) damages due to flooding; f) competition among users for the resource.
Water management in the DF
In 2003, two previous government agencies were merged into the SACM (Water System of Mexico City). Before this merge the DGCOH (General Direction of Hydraulic Construction) was in charge of supplying water to the DF and constructing and maintaining the primary water network. The CADF (Water Commission of the Federal District) collected tariffs, supervised the job of the private companies and served the users. The second was created as part of the reforms that aimed to decentralise and promote private participation in the sector in 1992.
There are other agencies involved in water issues in the DF. The treasury, as well as the private companies and the SACM, collects bills and concentrates the total revenue from the system. The 16 delegaciones take care of the secondary network, which is the smaller diameter network delivering directly to the users. The SACM supplies bulk water for each delegación to distribute it. This gives the SACM considerable power in deciding where water goes without giving the delegación much room for manoeuvre, which will be addressed latter on.
The delegaciones have several difficulties in fulfilling their obligations. The most significant problems are related to the lack of human capacity, financial and human resources. The lack of materials for repairs of leakages and ageing personnel are two recurrent problems in most delegaciones. Moreover there are several services that are still centralised in the SACM making the delegaciones only intermediaries of paperwork. This demonstrates an incomplete decentralisation process (Delgado, 2004).
Concerning how the service is brought to different areas of the city by the authorities, Ward (1986) explains how the provision of water services in the irregular settlements is ‘open to partisan political influence’ (p. 91). He argues that the agencies designed to procure water to Mexico City have a technical image due to the relative success of providing water to many parts of the city. Yet when it comes to decide what neighbourhoods will be connected to the system and with what frequency they will receive water it becomes more a decision of the hierarchy of politicians, up to the mayor or even the president.
In 1997 the inhabitants of the DF for the first time elected a mayor and a local assembly with legislative powers (ALDF). A left wing party, the PRD, has dominated the political scene since; although the prevailing party nationally for 70 years, the PRI, continues to dominate in the State of Mexico. How this has changed the patronage system is still unclear. But the fact is that several parties try to compete for electorate support and it is not uncommon that they use the promise of better water provision for winning an election.
The ALDF is very aware of the strategic role water management plays in the development of the city. It published a water law in 2003 that specified the roles of the SACM and the delegaciones. Some members of parliament are continuously in touch with the SACM advocating for water services for different neighbourhoods and are commonly heading demonstrations. Currently there is a Special Committee for Integral Water Management in the ALDF working on how to improve the water management in the city with a particular focus on improving participation, financial sustainability, water provision and environmental sustainability (ALDF, 2004).
Private sector
In 1993, four private companies formed through combinations of national corporations and transnational water giants signed ten-year service contracts for the Federal District. Among the water transnationals involved in the city are Générales Des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise Des Eaux (today Suez), Anglian Water and Severn Trend (Martínez Omaña, 2004). A new contract negotiation is currently taking place. According to a water official the changes in conditions will not be significant (Germán Martínez Santoyo, interviewed by the author, 23/07/04).
The four private companies are responsible for users’ registration, the water metering and billing. This is a considerable increase in private participation in the sector but it is not complete privatisation or divestiture. According to Martínez Omaña (2004), the overall performance of the water companies has led to some improvements. Particularly considering efficiency in management, metering and billing, the private corporations have improved the situation in the DF.
Nevertheless according to Castro (2003) the public reaction to this was negative: ‘the response of water users took largely the form of civil disobedience, such as the non payment of water bills in protest for the steep increases in the tariff, but also included the destruction of water meters and other actions to sabotage the functioning of the new system’ (p.30). In fact, the employees of these four private companies wear uniforms and carry personal identifications using the SACM’s name instead of that of their own company.
Even those most in favour of private participation have seen the problems this has brought in the country. A WB document recognises: ‘The relative failure of PSP in Mexico has been exacerbated by a combination factors, including the absence of a clear regulatory framework for private participation, and design and procurement flaws resulting from ad hoc processes carried out by unprepared municipalities’ (Kemper and Alvarado, 2000). In addition the OECD emphasised this problem: ‘the regulatory environment proved insufficient, especially because the number of public organisations in the water sector led to severe co-ordination problems’ (OECD, 2003:126). Possibly this problem could be solved with the merge of the two previous government agencies into the SACM as mentioned earlier.
Yet private sector participation is most probably to continue and increase to some extent in the DF. While the number of employees of the public agencies – particularly with the creation of the SAMC – continues to decrease, the challenge of coordination among different government levels in order to be more capable of supervising the private companies remains. As long as this is not achieved, those who have currently the worst water services or no service at all will suffer most.
Organised civil society
Although the water law explicitly states that the CNA is to promote and favour users’ participation including decision-making capacities (LAN, 2004), the achievements of the organisations it created for this purpose, the Basin Councils, are unsatisfactory. The aim of these councils is to contribute to the integrated management of water, promoting sustainability and local participation. Yet the widespread belief in the academic sector and the local government is that they fail to achieve the goal of participation (interviewed by the author: Germán Martínez Santoyo, 23/07/04, Martha Delgado, 3/08/04).
Even the CNA admits the structure does not help to enhance participation (CNA, 2003). Allowing only one representative for agricultural water users and one for urban users as representatives of entire basins is clearly not enough for participation claims to be believed. Moreover the competences of the Basin Councils are narrow because they only authorise and supervise the programmes and plans but do not take part in many other important issues, for example tariff approvals or pollution charges (CNA, 2003).
For Martha Delgado, the member of local parliament driving water reforms in the DF, the Basin Councils are the spaces where users just sort out who is going to obtain what amount of water. They fail to promote wider participation and do not address issues of conservation. Additionally the CNA is inexperienced in dealing with social groups, particularly because its staff is dominated by technical specialists (interview with the author, 3/08/04).
Sadly, according to her, environmental NGOs in Mexico are not particularly concerned about water issues. These organisations, she argues, are not organised territorially but in relation to topics and they have not been generating debate in this area. Then the discussions around water issues become focused in how water should be distributed, disregarding how it should be managed for conservation and eventually making distribution easier.
Nevertheless at a community level, people do organise to contest the authority around service delivery issues. This has been a constant feature in the urbanisation process of the city. Recently, one of the most significant achievements of continuous protesting with the backing of local assembly members was by the inhabitants of the Sierra de Santa Catarina in Iztapalapa. Thanks to their ability to organise, they managed to get exemption of the payment of massive debts to the CADF. They made their point because the low quality water service they received could not justify the charges.
The unsuitability of the existing ‘spaces for participation’ is manifested in the frequency of water related conflicts in the metropolitan area. Two different studies show the considerable unrest concerning water issues in the metropolis. Castro (2004) analysed water related conflicts (from peaceful petitions to violent actions) through press reports from 1985 to 1992. His study shows the concentration of the conflicts in the DF in three delegaciones, but the majority of events were in some municipalities in the State of Mexico. This showed that lack of water is only suffered in some areas of the city. Central to his argument is the fact that water conflicts arise because of socio-political problems, not because of scarcity of the resource. In this sense, the current governance system allows management decisions to favour certain areas of the city over others generating socially unjust results.
The second study is that of Sainz Santamaría and Becerra Pérez (2003). They studied water conflicts at the national level and found that half of them were in Mexico City. They also found that the main way citizens manifested their demands was through demonstrations. This shows how urgent changes in the governance system are in order to solve these conflicts in more satisfactory and lasting ways.
All the previous discussion evidences that there are problems in the way the public, private and social sectors operate concerning water governance in Mexico City. The end result is that a considerable portion of the population either lacks water services or has a poor service. In the next section of this work, the discussion will be centred in which problems principally affect the residential water users in the city.
Social injustice in water issues in Mexico City
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, I consider that the two key dimensions of social justice are distribution and participation. In the previous section I have already dealt with the problems in the water governance system concerning the lack of proper channels for users’ participation to take part in the decisions concerning the management of the resource. This section will be more concentrated in the problems of distribution of water, the resulting social injustices and the conflicts generated by them. The distribution problems will be identified related with water availability and the way it is available, its quality, affordability and differences in price. Also, the important considerations of uneven spatial distribution and the differences among water uses – residential and non-residential (industry, commerce and services) – will be kept in mind.
Distribution and availability
The water available for the DF is 35m3/s; and, as the current general director of the SACM expressed in an interview, no more will be transported to the city (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). Although there is a proposal for bringing water from Temascaltepec, the financial, political and environmental costs would be substantial. A much wiser choice is to work on demand management, efficiency, conservation and distribution.
Indeed the fact that the DF already has this water supply presents controversy and conflict with the State of Mexico that now claims the water from the Lerma and Cutzamala as theirs. Furthermore the untreated drainage of the DF generates serious problems to the state of Hidalgo where this highly polluted water is used for irrigation of crops consumed by the inhabitants of the city.
Thus the 35m3/s of water has to be somehow distributed among more than 8.6 million people that live in the DF. In 2000 only in the DF - which has been traditionally the place in Mexico that enjoys the best services – there were more than 400,000 dwellings without water connection inside their home (INEGI, 2000). This represents 22% of the dwellings in the capital. However a more common number given by the authorities is that 97% of the population has a water connection in the plot of their home. The mismatch of the data is because 19% of the dwellings have a water connection inside the plot where they live but not inside their home. Most probably this would often be a shared faucet with other dwellings in the plot. Although this is clearly a better access to water than having to walk considerable distances to fetch water outside the plot, it is still not an optimum service.
One of the most notorious differences in availability in the city is that between the east and west. Water availability in the west is more than enough, while in the east this is not so. The west is where the water from the external sources, the Lerma and Cutzamala, get into Mexico City (Tortajada, 2003). Therefore the pressures in this area are very high and water appears abundant (Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004). Not surprisingly the wealthiest neighbourhoods are located in the west while the poorer ones in the east (Ward, 1998). The location of lower income groups in the east of the city was because the upper and middle classes took over the west. The east and north are the areas where the lakes of the basin used to be (De Garay, 1856). Thus the problems of flooding were – and in some places still are – very frequent and made the areas less desirable.
Water distribution among the delegaciones is highly unequal and generates conflict especially during the dry season, when even authorities enter into conflict for the resource. For instance, the delegación Tláhuac limits with Iztapalapa. Both have an important number of users supplied through the tandeo[2] system. During the dry season these users are the first to suffer scarcity and the struggle for the resource is not only the demand from the users to their authorities but also among authorities themselves to satisfy their users’ claims. There are no institutional channels currently in place for these conflicts to be resolved.
In this difficult context where many residential users face the reality of having to invest considerable energy and time in getting water, 80% of the industries in the basin directly extract the water they need from wells. Many of these industries consume enormous amounts of the resource in their production processes. Here the debate of water as a public good or as an economic commodity becomes relevant. In my opinion it would be possible to defend water used for survival and hygiene as a public good and make it available to everybody, whereas water as an input for production is an economic commodity that should be priced accordingly (see section on ‘Affordability and price differences’). Yet this distinction does not necessarily brings us closer to a solution for distribution because if water is scarce then one or both of the uses will be limited in their consumption. This limitation would either impact the quality of life of the population having less water than they need or impact economic activities – which could eventually affect the availability of jobs and the wages paid, thus ultimately affecting people’s life quality. Certainly the residential use is the priority in social justice terms but it is a complex problem.
Distribution and quality
However the problems with water delivery are not only about having a water connection and getting it in a sufficient amount but also with good quality. For decades, citizens have been aware of the need to boil tap water to make it drinkable. But increasingly the problem of the quality in city water is not only about the presence of bacteria but of salinity, chloride ions, iron, manganese, ammonium and faecal coliforms (Ezcurra et al, 1999).
The greater problems of water quality are again found in the east, north and rural south of the city coinciding with the areas where the lower income groups live. Moreover there are constant claims that the water provided through the truck services has visible organisms and green or brown colour (Olayo Guadarrama, 2002). This situation is worse when the unavailability of the service forces people to stock water in inadequate containers that provoke further contamination of the water.
Affordability and price differences
Commonly water utilities consider two or three water uses and classify them as: residential water use and non-residential water use (industrial and/or commercial). This is the case in Mexico City. According to the use given to the resource, water tariffs are charged differently. This is only sensible because water used for survival and hygiene cannot be perceived as equivalent to water used as an input to a product. Thus there is a cross-subsidy between the non-residential and the residential use.
Both water usage tariffs are structured as inverted block rates. In this way, users consuming more water will be paying more per cubic meter than those using less water. The aim of tariffs set in this way is to promote conservation. Nevertheless there are problems in how the residential tariffs are set.
Residential users pay a subsidised tariff even if their consumption is excessive. In 2003, considering the average cost to the DF for each cubic metre it provided, the cost of operation would be covered only until a household consumed 90 m3 per month. Considering that the average household in the DF is 4.2 persons, basic water consumption according to Gleick would be 6.3 m3 per month. Even what the CADF regards as normal water consumption, 20 m3 per month (Germán Martínez Santoyo, interview with the author, 23/07/04), evidences a subsidy for a very high consumption. In these circumstances the goal of promoting conservation through tariffs may not be met, particularly for more affluent households for whom this water charge is insignificant.
Yet the solution of just restructuring the rates for families consuming more than 20m3 per month to pay at least the operation costs would have other problems. Often, lower income families tend to form larger households (particularly as a strategy to share expenditure among the extended family), consequently consuming more water than smaller households that might be better off. Thus, unless other measures are taken to target these lower-income larger households, there would be a socially unjust charging because it would be unfavourable for the most disadvantaged.
However with the current charges, when considering the water delivered by the utility, it is difficult to say that water is unaffordable. In the case of having only the minimum salary, normal water consumption would represent 4% of the income. Taking into account that in a general calculation spending 5% of an income in water is regarded as affordable (Winpenny, 2003); water in the city appears to be affordable. Nevertheless the problem arises when the family does not have a connection or the tandeo system does not satisfy their water requirements. It is here when water needs to be obtained through other systems that the issue of affordability becomes a concern, when the price paid for the resource is unjust and water becomes an expensive commodity for the poor.
Getting water through truck services is certainly much more expensive than receiving it through a water connection. The delegaciones provide water trucks for those without a water connection, and, when there is scarcity, for those neighbourhoods, generally in the east of the city, with connections that do not receive water (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). This service is supposed to be free if the neighbourhood is regular, but in practice corruption of the drivers is common, demanding ‘tips’ for their service (Olayo Guadarrama, 2002). In contrast with the cost it represents to pay water from the utility, the cost paid for water from trucks can be 10 times as much, becoming unaffordable.
Getting water trucks to fill the containers at home is not an easy task and it is generally done by women. In times of scarcity, women can spend up to 10 hours of the day to obtain the water they need for 2 days (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). This is a work load that restrains their ability to get engaged in income earning activities. It is not surprising that when it comes to demonstrations and other contentions to the authorities women dominate the scene (Delgado, 2004).
Another problem of affordability arises with connection charges. A water connection represents nearly two times a minimum month salary. There are no financing mechanisms for this payment. Adding to this is the very tedious and difficult procedure a user needs to follow to get a connection which might even take two years. In these circumstances no wonder there is a high percentage of illegal connections. These are estimated to be in the delegación Cuauhtemoc of 40 per cent (Delgado, 2004)!
In support of the argument set forward in the previous section of this work about the role of conflict in achieving a more socially just distribution and management of water, let us consider the example of Iztapalapa. Iztapalapa is the most populated delegación in the DF. It is located in the east of the city, having the availability problems of the area mentioned earlier. This delegación has traditionally been a combative one, promoting collective action in demonstrations and street blockages. Today many of the projects for improving the water provision in the city are concentrated in this area. Among the projects are the reopening of wells and purifying plants that aim to improve the water availability in Iztapalapa.
Yet much remains to be done to approach a more socially just distribution and management of water in Mexico City. The social injustice of the difference in the water service received by users in the DF is manifested in multiple ways. In the end it is generally neighbourhoods in the east delegaciones that receive the worst water quality, the least reliability of the service and pay the highest prices, with the women within these households bearing the heaviest burden. This in turn generates conflicts that have now challenged the governance system to the extent that the local parliament is working on various reforms to improve the current laws in water and the water service.
[1] Proposals concerning how water from other sources could be transferred to the city do exist but due to the high political, ecological, social and financial costs they would represent, they have not been carried out so far.
[2] Tandeo refers to water serviced in an inconstant manner. In some neighbourhoods that have water connections, water is only available at certain times of certain days to overcome the problem that the offer is less than the demand. This worsens during drought periods.(Libreros Munioz and Quiniones Castillo, 2004)
When the Spaniards arrived in Tenochtitlan (today Mexico City) they could not believe their eyes. The city was built on lakes. Starting from an island in the middle, the city extended into the lakes and had canals as roads. The Spaniards progressively desiccated the closed basin draining its water to other rivers. What remains of those lakes makes it difficult to picture what that landscape used to be. Paradoxically, what used to be a city built on water is today a city that suffers problems of water availability. But as it will be argued, these problems do not affect all in the same way.
By the 1950s, due to the high demand for the resource, the rate of extraction exceeded the rate of recharge of the ground waters – the source that amounts for the majority of the water of the city – and water started to be pumped from two other exterior rivers (Lerma and Cutzamala rivers) (CNA, 2000: 74). The overexploitation of the ground waters has caused serious problems to many constructions in the city which are literarily sinking due to the nature of the soil of the desiccated lakes. The lowering of the water table amounts to 1 metre annually (Tortajada, 2003: 125) and over extraction of the groundwater is calculated to be higher than 140 per cent (CNA, 2000:75). Additionally the recharge areas have been substantially reduced owing to the urbanisation of the previous forests.
Mexico City’s sprawl has extended beyond the limits of the Federal District (DF) to the State of Mexico. The Metropolitan Area of Mexico’s Valley (ZMVM) is integrated by the 16 delegaciones of the DF, 58 municipalities of the State of Mexico and one of the state of Hidalgo. The municipalities had 9.7 million inhabitants in 2000 and a population growth rate of 2.41. For this same year the Federal District (DF) had 8.6 million and 0.3 growth rate (SEDUVI, 2001). The built-up area of the city is estimated in 1500 km2, however the metropolitan area comprises 4500 km2 (Ward, 1998). There is no metropolitan authority to carry on policies for the city. As it will be explained further on, for water issues other municipalities with the ZMVM form a hydrological region.
The water provision for the metropolitan area was at the beginning of the 1990s 62 cubic meters per second and for the DF approximately of 35 m3/s. This share of water for the DF has remained the same[1] meaning that to respond to growing demand the solution has been leakage control (Martínez Omaña, 2004). The amount of water lost through leakages in the DF in 1997 was 37%; in 2001 it was of 30% (Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004). This is still an expensive inefficiency.
Owing to the nature of Mexico City, being divided into differently organised entities, the DF and the State of Mexico, and for the sake of brevity, some of the following information will only be about the DF. However the fact that a substantial part of the city has sprawled to the State of Mexico and that there are differences in the water service is important and will to some extent be addressed.
Water governance in Mexico City
Considering that governance is the way a society organises its affairs, the way this will be done is related to the perceptions and beliefs prevalent in that society. Water, due to its indispensable character for life, is considered in many societies as a public good, even as ‘sacred’ (Whiteford and Melville, 2002; Shiva, 2002). Not least in the case of Mexico, where the perception of water as a community resource was clearly found in the indigenous Mexicans before the Spanish arrived, in the laws the Spanish brought with them, and was formally established as a public good after the beginning of the twentieth century Revolution and Constitution. Governance systems that perceive water as a public good generally try, at least in principle, to make it available to everybody. Indeed this is the idea of the need to provide universal access to essential services.
Yet in 1992 the legislation was changed. Castro (2003) explains that the process was ‘increasing state control over water resources, while simultaneously transforming the status of water from public to private good, and organizing its governance around market principles’(p.28). The premise was that scarcity problems in Mexico were because water had not been treated as an economic good. The importance of increasing state control was because of the need to regain power over water that was managed by communities so the municipalities would be directly in charge. The municipalities could then involve the private sector in the management of the resource. Since then, private participation in the water sector has increased in several states of the country changing the configuration of the water governance system from one previously dominated by the central government to one where the private sector and the local governments play increasingly an important role. Nevertheless there are important problems in the decentralisation process generating coordination inefficiencies.
In the next paragraphs, the roles of different actors of governance in the water sector in Mexico City will be addressed. Starting by giving a national overview, then the particular case of the Federal District will be introduced. Next the privatisation of water services and some of its consequences in the DF will be briefly tackled. Lastly the role of the organised civil society will be considered.
Public sector
Water management at the federal level
The National Water Commission (CNA) is the federal agency in command of the administration, policy making, custody and allocation of water in Mexico. Created in 1989, this organisation, together with the new law of national waters dictated in 1992, started a new way of management of the resource. It promoted two important things: decentralisation and privatisation (Martínez Omaña, 2004). The CNA is today a deconcentrated organisation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT).
One of the CNA’s most important activities is to supply bulk water to settlements. It is not its responsibility, though, to distribute within the settlements, and in some cases it is the local government that does the extraction of water. For instance, in the DF the water that is extracted from the underground is the responsibility of the local authority, while that brought from external sources is provided by the CNA. The municipalities and the DF are supposed to pay the CNA for the bulk water it provides, but many municipalities are indebted with this federal authority.
Martinez-Lagunes and Rodriguez-Tirado (1998) identify two important problems that this organisation has. Firstly, although one of the reasons for creating the CNA was to concentrate in a single agency water issues and favour co-ordination, this has not been entirely achieved. Secondly, the activities of CNA have created conflicts of interest within. For example, it is at the same time regulator of water quality and responsible for sewage discharge. The aim is to change this giving the CNA a predominantly normative character, yet maintaining technical support for the local authorities (CNA, 2003).
The CNA has organised water management in 13 hydrological regions. This is of considerable importance because it means that instead of managing the resource according to political divisions, it is managed with a logic that aims to be integrated and ecologically sustainable. Also important to sustainability is that finally water is part of the SEMARNAT, not of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) as it used to be. Notwithstanding these changes in the management of water, the goal of achieving environmental sustainability is still very far from being met.
The hydrological region Mexico City belongs to is called the Mexico’s Valley Region. It includes the DF, 56 municipalities of the State of Mexico, 39 of Hidalgo and 4 of Tlaxcala. The most important problems of the region identified in the National Hydraulic Programme (CNA, 2000:75) are: a) the overexploitation of underground waters, calculated as representing 140 per cent of the recharge capacity; b) water pollution; c) insufficient water delivery; d) significant inefficiency in irrigation systems and urban uses; e) damages due to flooding; f) competition among users for the resource.
Water management in the DF
In 2003, two previous government agencies were merged into the SACM (Water System of Mexico City). Before this merge the DGCOH (General Direction of Hydraulic Construction) was in charge of supplying water to the DF and constructing and maintaining the primary water network. The CADF (Water Commission of the Federal District) collected tariffs, supervised the job of the private companies and served the users. The second was created as part of the reforms that aimed to decentralise and promote private participation in the sector in 1992.
There are other agencies involved in water issues in the DF. The treasury, as well as the private companies and the SACM, collects bills and concentrates the total revenue from the system. The 16 delegaciones take care of the secondary network, which is the smaller diameter network delivering directly to the users. The SACM supplies bulk water for each delegación to distribute it. This gives the SACM considerable power in deciding where water goes without giving the delegación much room for manoeuvre, which will be addressed latter on.
The delegaciones have several difficulties in fulfilling their obligations. The most significant problems are related to the lack of human capacity, financial and human resources. The lack of materials for repairs of leakages and ageing personnel are two recurrent problems in most delegaciones. Moreover there are several services that are still centralised in the SACM making the delegaciones only intermediaries of paperwork. This demonstrates an incomplete decentralisation process (Delgado, 2004).
Concerning how the service is brought to different areas of the city by the authorities, Ward (1986) explains how the provision of water services in the irregular settlements is ‘open to partisan political influence’ (p. 91). He argues that the agencies designed to procure water to Mexico City have a technical image due to the relative success of providing water to many parts of the city. Yet when it comes to decide what neighbourhoods will be connected to the system and with what frequency they will receive water it becomes more a decision of the hierarchy of politicians, up to the mayor or even the president.
In 1997 the inhabitants of the DF for the first time elected a mayor and a local assembly with legislative powers (ALDF). A left wing party, the PRD, has dominated the political scene since; although the prevailing party nationally for 70 years, the PRI, continues to dominate in the State of Mexico. How this has changed the patronage system is still unclear. But the fact is that several parties try to compete for electorate support and it is not uncommon that they use the promise of better water provision for winning an election.
The ALDF is very aware of the strategic role water management plays in the development of the city. It published a water law in 2003 that specified the roles of the SACM and the delegaciones. Some members of parliament are continuously in touch with the SACM advocating for water services for different neighbourhoods and are commonly heading demonstrations. Currently there is a Special Committee for Integral Water Management in the ALDF working on how to improve the water management in the city with a particular focus on improving participation, financial sustainability, water provision and environmental sustainability (ALDF, 2004).
Private sector
In 1993, four private companies formed through combinations of national corporations and transnational water giants signed ten-year service contracts for the Federal District. Among the water transnationals involved in the city are Générales Des Eaux, Suez-Lyonnaise Des Eaux (today Suez), Anglian Water and Severn Trend (Martínez Omaña, 2004). A new contract negotiation is currently taking place. According to a water official the changes in conditions will not be significant (Germán Martínez Santoyo, interviewed by the author, 23/07/04).
The four private companies are responsible for users’ registration, the water metering and billing. This is a considerable increase in private participation in the sector but it is not complete privatisation or divestiture. According to Martínez Omaña (2004), the overall performance of the water companies has led to some improvements. Particularly considering efficiency in management, metering and billing, the private corporations have improved the situation in the DF.
Nevertheless according to Castro (2003) the public reaction to this was negative: ‘the response of water users took largely the form of civil disobedience, such as the non payment of water bills in protest for the steep increases in the tariff, but also included the destruction of water meters and other actions to sabotage the functioning of the new system’ (p.30). In fact, the employees of these four private companies wear uniforms and carry personal identifications using the SACM’s name instead of that of their own company.
Even those most in favour of private participation have seen the problems this has brought in the country. A WB document recognises: ‘The relative failure of PSP in Mexico has been exacerbated by a combination factors, including the absence of a clear regulatory framework for private participation, and design and procurement flaws resulting from ad hoc processes carried out by unprepared municipalities’ (Kemper and Alvarado, 2000). In addition the OECD emphasised this problem: ‘the regulatory environment proved insufficient, especially because the number of public organisations in the water sector led to severe co-ordination problems’ (OECD, 2003:126). Possibly this problem could be solved with the merge of the two previous government agencies into the SACM as mentioned earlier.
Yet private sector participation is most probably to continue and increase to some extent in the DF. While the number of employees of the public agencies – particularly with the creation of the SAMC – continues to decrease, the challenge of coordination among different government levels in order to be more capable of supervising the private companies remains. As long as this is not achieved, those who have currently the worst water services or no service at all will suffer most.
Organised civil society
Although the water law explicitly states that the CNA is to promote and favour users’ participation including decision-making capacities (LAN, 2004), the achievements of the organisations it created for this purpose, the Basin Councils, are unsatisfactory. The aim of these councils is to contribute to the integrated management of water, promoting sustainability and local participation. Yet the widespread belief in the academic sector and the local government is that they fail to achieve the goal of participation (interviewed by the author: Germán Martínez Santoyo, 23/07/04, Martha Delgado, 3/08/04).
Even the CNA admits the structure does not help to enhance participation (CNA, 2003). Allowing only one representative for agricultural water users and one for urban users as representatives of entire basins is clearly not enough for participation claims to be believed. Moreover the competences of the Basin Councils are narrow because they only authorise and supervise the programmes and plans but do not take part in many other important issues, for example tariff approvals or pollution charges (CNA, 2003).
For Martha Delgado, the member of local parliament driving water reforms in the DF, the Basin Councils are the spaces where users just sort out who is going to obtain what amount of water. They fail to promote wider participation and do not address issues of conservation. Additionally the CNA is inexperienced in dealing with social groups, particularly because its staff is dominated by technical specialists (interview with the author, 3/08/04).
Sadly, according to her, environmental NGOs in Mexico are not particularly concerned about water issues. These organisations, she argues, are not organised territorially but in relation to topics and they have not been generating debate in this area. Then the discussions around water issues become focused in how water should be distributed, disregarding how it should be managed for conservation and eventually making distribution easier.
Nevertheless at a community level, people do organise to contest the authority around service delivery issues. This has been a constant feature in the urbanisation process of the city. Recently, one of the most significant achievements of continuous protesting with the backing of local assembly members was by the inhabitants of the Sierra de Santa Catarina in Iztapalapa. Thanks to their ability to organise, they managed to get exemption of the payment of massive debts to the CADF. They made their point because the low quality water service they received could not justify the charges.
The unsuitability of the existing ‘spaces for participation’ is manifested in the frequency of water related conflicts in the metropolitan area. Two different studies show the considerable unrest concerning water issues in the metropolis. Castro (2004) analysed water related conflicts (from peaceful petitions to violent actions) through press reports from 1985 to 1992. His study shows the concentration of the conflicts in the DF in three delegaciones, but the majority of events were in some municipalities in the State of Mexico. This showed that lack of water is only suffered in some areas of the city. Central to his argument is the fact that water conflicts arise because of socio-political problems, not because of scarcity of the resource. In this sense, the current governance system allows management decisions to favour certain areas of the city over others generating socially unjust results.
The second study is that of Sainz Santamaría and Becerra Pérez (2003). They studied water conflicts at the national level and found that half of them were in Mexico City. They also found that the main way citizens manifested their demands was through demonstrations. This shows how urgent changes in the governance system are in order to solve these conflicts in more satisfactory and lasting ways.
All the previous discussion evidences that there are problems in the way the public, private and social sectors operate concerning water governance in Mexico City. The end result is that a considerable portion of the population either lacks water services or has a poor service. In the next section of this work, the discussion will be centred in which problems principally affect the residential water users in the city.
Social injustice in water issues in Mexico City
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, I consider that the two key dimensions of social justice are distribution and participation. In the previous section I have already dealt with the problems in the water governance system concerning the lack of proper channels for users’ participation to take part in the decisions concerning the management of the resource. This section will be more concentrated in the problems of distribution of water, the resulting social injustices and the conflicts generated by them. The distribution problems will be identified related with water availability and the way it is available, its quality, affordability and differences in price. Also, the important considerations of uneven spatial distribution and the differences among water uses – residential and non-residential (industry, commerce and services) – will be kept in mind.
Distribution and availability
The water available for the DF is 35m3/s; and, as the current general director of the SACM expressed in an interview, no more will be transported to the city (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). Although there is a proposal for bringing water from Temascaltepec, the financial, political and environmental costs would be substantial. A much wiser choice is to work on demand management, efficiency, conservation and distribution.
Indeed the fact that the DF already has this water supply presents controversy and conflict with the State of Mexico that now claims the water from the Lerma and Cutzamala as theirs. Furthermore the untreated drainage of the DF generates serious problems to the state of Hidalgo where this highly polluted water is used for irrigation of crops consumed by the inhabitants of the city.
Thus the 35m3/s of water has to be somehow distributed among more than 8.6 million people that live in the DF. In 2000 only in the DF - which has been traditionally the place in Mexico that enjoys the best services – there were more than 400,000 dwellings without water connection inside their home (INEGI, 2000). This represents 22% of the dwellings in the capital. However a more common number given by the authorities is that 97% of the population has a water connection in the plot of their home. The mismatch of the data is because 19% of the dwellings have a water connection inside the plot where they live but not inside their home. Most probably this would often be a shared faucet with other dwellings in the plot. Although this is clearly a better access to water than having to walk considerable distances to fetch water outside the plot, it is still not an optimum service.
One of the most notorious differences in availability in the city is that between the east and west. Water availability in the west is more than enough, while in the east this is not so. The west is where the water from the external sources, the Lerma and Cutzamala, get into Mexico City (Tortajada, 2003). Therefore the pressures in this area are very high and water appears abundant (Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004). Not surprisingly the wealthiest neighbourhoods are located in the west while the poorer ones in the east (Ward, 1998). The location of lower income groups in the east of the city was because the upper and middle classes took over the west. The east and north are the areas where the lakes of the basin used to be (De Garay, 1856). Thus the problems of flooding were – and in some places still are – very frequent and made the areas less desirable.
Water distribution among the delegaciones is highly unequal and generates conflict especially during the dry season, when even authorities enter into conflict for the resource. For instance, the delegación Tláhuac limits with Iztapalapa. Both have an important number of users supplied through the tandeo[2] system. During the dry season these users are the first to suffer scarcity and the struggle for the resource is not only the demand from the users to their authorities but also among authorities themselves to satisfy their users’ claims. There are no institutional channels currently in place for these conflicts to be resolved.
In this difficult context where many residential users face the reality of having to invest considerable energy and time in getting water, 80% of the industries in the basin directly extract the water they need from wells. Many of these industries consume enormous amounts of the resource in their production processes. Here the debate of water as a public good or as an economic commodity becomes relevant. In my opinion it would be possible to defend water used for survival and hygiene as a public good and make it available to everybody, whereas water as an input for production is an economic commodity that should be priced accordingly (see section on ‘Affordability and price differences’). Yet this distinction does not necessarily brings us closer to a solution for distribution because if water is scarce then one or both of the uses will be limited in their consumption. This limitation would either impact the quality of life of the population having less water than they need or impact economic activities – which could eventually affect the availability of jobs and the wages paid, thus ultimately affecting people’s life quality. Certainly the residential use is the priority in social justice terms but it is a complex problem.
Distribution and quality
However the problems with water delivery are not only about having a water connection and getting it in a sufficient amount but also with good quality. For decades, citizens have been aware of the need to boil tap water to make it drinkable. But increasingly the problem of the quality in city water is not only about the presence of bacteria but of salinity, chloride ions, iron, manganese, ammonium and faecal coliforms (Ezcurra et al, 1999).
The greater problems of water quality are again found in the east, north and rural south of the city coinciding with the areas where the lower income groups live. Moreover there are constant claims that the water provided through the truck services has visible organisms and green or brown colour (Olayo Guadarrama, 2002). This situation is worse when the unavailability of the service forces people to stock water in inadequate containers that provoke further contamination of the water.
Affordability and price differences
Commonly water utilities consider two or three water uses and classify them as: residential water use and non-residential water use (industrial and/or commercial). This is the case in Mexico City. According to the use given to the resource, water tariffs are charged differently. This is only sensible because water used for survival and hygiene cannot be perceived as equivalent to water used as an input to a product. Thus there is a cross-subsidy between the non-residential and the residential use.
Both water usage tariffs are structured as inverted block rates. In this way, users consuming more water will be paying more per cubic meter than those using less water. The aim of tariffs set in this way is to promote conservation. Nevertheless there are problems in how the residential tariffs are set.
Residential users pay a subsidised tariff even if their consumption is excessive. In 2003, considering the average cost to the DF for each cubic metre it provided, the cost of operation would be covered only until a household consumed 90 m3 per month. Considering that the average household in the DF is 4.2 persons, basic water consumption according to Gleick would be 6.3 m3 per month. Even what the CADF regards as normal water consumption, 20 m3 per month (Germán Martínez Santoyo, interview with the author, 23/07/04), evidences a subsidy for a very high consumption. In these circumstances the goal of promoting conservation through tariffs may not be met, particularly for more affluent households for whom this water charge is insignificant.
Yet the solution of just restructuring the rates for families consuming more than 20m3 per month to pay at least the operation costs would have other problems. Often, lower income families tend to form larger households (particularly as a strategy to share expenditure among the extended family), consequently consuming more water than smaller households that might be better off. Thus, unless other measures are taken to target these lower-income larger households, there would be a socially unjust charging because it would be unfavourable for the most disadvantaged.
However with the current charges, when considering the water delivered by the utility, it is difficult to say that water is unaffordable. In the case of having only the minimum salary, normal water consumption would represent 4% of the income. Taking into account that in a general calculation spending 5% of an income in water is regarded as affordable (Winpenny, 2003); water in the city appears to be affordable. Nevertheless the problem arises when the family does not have a connection or the tandeo system does not satisfy their water requirements. It is here when water needs to be obtained through other systems that the issue of affordability becomes a concern, when the price paid for the resource is unjust and water becomes an expensive commodity for the poor.
Getting water through truck services is certainly much more expensive than receiving it through a water connection. The delegaciones provide water trucks for those without a water connection, and, when there is scarcity, for those neighbourhoods, generally in the east of the city, with connections that do not receive water (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). This service is supposed to be free if the neighbourhood is regular, but in practice corruption of the drivers is common, demanding ‘tips’ for their service (Olayo Guadarrama, 2002). In contrast with the cost it represents to pay water from the utility, the cost paid for water from trucks can be 10 times as much, becoming unaffordable.
Getting water trucks to fill the containers at home is not an easy task and it is generally done by women. In times of scarcity, women can spend up to 10 hours of the day to obtain the water they need for 2 days (Ramirez Cuevas, 2002). This is a work load that restrains their ability to get engaged in income earning activities. It is not surprising that when it comes to demonstrations and other contentions to the authorities women dominate the scene (Delgado, 2004).
Another problem of affordability arises with connection charges. A water connection represents nearly two times a minimum month salary. There are no financing mechanisms for this payment. Adding to this is the very tedious and difficult procedure a user needs to follow to get a connection which might even take two years. In these circumstances no wonder there is a high percentage of illegal connections. These are estimated to be in the delegación Cuauhtemoc of 40 per cent (Delgado, 2004)!
In support of the argument set forward in the previous section of this work about the role of conflict in achieving a more socially just distribution and management of water, let us consider the example of Iztapalapa. Iztapalapa is the most populated delegación in the DF. It is located in the east of the city, having the availability problems of the area mentioned earlier. This delegación has traditionally been a combative one, promoting collective action in demonstrations and street blockages. Today many of the projects for improving the water provision in the city are concentrated in this area. Among the projects are the reopening of wells and purifying plants that aim to improve the water availability in Iztapalapa.
Yet much remains to be done to approach a more socially just distribution and management of water in Mexico City. The social injustice of the difference in the water service received by users in the DF is manifested in multiple ways. In the end it is generally neighbourhoods in the east delegaciones that receive the worst water quality, the least reliability of the service and pay the highest prices, with the women within these households bearing the heaviest burden. This in turn generates conflicts that have now challenged the governance system to the extent that the local parliament is working on various reforms to improve the current laws in water and the water service.
[1] Proposals concerning how water from other sources could be transferred to the city do exist but due to the high political, ecological, social and financial costs they would represent, they have not been carried out so far.
[2] Tandeo refers to water serviced in an inconstant manner. In some neighbourhoods that have water connections, water is only available at certain times of certain days to overcome the problem that the offer is less than the demand. This worsens during drought periods.(Libreros Munioz and Quiniones Castillo, 2004)
Conclusions
Claudia Campero Arena
As a result of the analysis presented in this work the questions set in the introduction can now be addressed: How far is the water governance system in Mexico City responsible for a socially unjust distribution and management of the resource? How can civil struggle or conflict help to change governance systems to achieve more socially just results?
In relation to the first question, the argument set in this work is that the water governance system in Mexico City is definitely one of the causes for the prevailing socially unjust distribution and management of water. The current water governance system in the city is still dominated by the decisions of local government officials and to some extent of the private sector. The institutional channels for citizens to participate are far from being structured in a way that could guarantee meaningful participation. This is the first way the system becomes socially unjust in that it does not allow people to take part in the decision-making process that affects a central part of their lives. In practice, as it has been clear in the development of this work, the inhabitants of some of the areas that suffer water scarcity are highly involved and participate, not through institutional channels, but through different protest strategies.
The second way the governance system becomes responsible for a socially unjust distribution of water services is manifested in the fact that the decisions of where and how water is distributed is normally to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable, generally using the explanation of financial and technical limitations. The same neighbourhoods simultaneously suffer the worst service regarding availability, reliability and quality and are the ones that end up turning to water vendors paying much higher prices for their water. This has not only a technical or financial explanation, it is a expression of the power relations prevalent in the city, where people of these neighbourhood, particularly their women, find themselves powerless in front of the other actors defining how water services are managed and distributed.
Water scarcity is a constant theme when discussing the sustainability of Mexico City. Yet as discussed in this work, scarcity is suffered unequally. While citizens in Iztapalapa and other delegaciones suffer water unavailability for months, inhabitants of more affluent neighbourhoods have water uninterruptedly year-round. What is more the scarcity is not suffered equally within households, where normally women are responsible for overcoming the lack of water having to invest hours in fetching it.
The second question where the evidence is much less clear can now be addressed. Although it is appreciable that conflict over water, particularly when it brings together considerable number of citizens to contest the authority, can motivate responses in them to somehow resolve the claims, the solutions are commonly ephemeral. Yet this continuous battle with the authorities has, not only in Mexico but in other Latin-American countries, brought significantly improved water services (Bennett, 1995). Now, the question of whether these conflicts have actually changed the governance system to achieve more socially just results is one step further. The fact that the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF) has created a Special Commission for the Integral Management of Water shows to some extent recognition of the present deficiencies in the governance system. The uncertainty is whether the resulting law modifications will help to improve social justice in water services. Moreover, the question of whether the law will be put in practice is pertinent because there are plenty examples in the country where laws are not practiced.
The need to improve regulation in the water sector of the city is nonetheless evident. The SACM needs to have greater supervision on the private companies work to improve the water service particularly for those who suffer most the scarcity of the resource. Furthermore the role of the delegaciones has to be restudied to be more effective in addressing citizens’ needs and improving efficiency. Moreover the participation channels for citizens involvement in water distribution and management is central for social justice.
According to Martha Delgado, the water sector in Mexico City is crumbling. She admits there are people working to improve the situation; but will it be enough to revert the tendency? We need urgent investment, she emphasises (interview with the author, 3/08/04). Yes, investment is needed, but the way this investment is used will be defined by the power struggles within the governance system. Those who suffer the worst service might fight for an improvement, but how well organised they are – and the honesty of their leaders to avoid co-option – will be crucial to success. Indeed, there are other areas that like Iztapalapa suffer water scarcity, but the combativeness and organisation of this delegación has helped it to be at the centre of attention.
The fact that governance systems do change in time is somewhat encouraging, but how the power relations will evolve is difficult to tell. Will the result of the local water law amendments improve the conditions of some of the poorest in the city? If it is the result of an exercise of wide participation of the different actors, including the most vulnerable, it might to certain extent be a more socially just result. But given the present situation this will most probably be a long process of struggle. Some hard decisions – regarding participation, distribution and management – would be necessary to arrive at a more socially just result. This involves changing power balances which is not something that normally happens as the result of good will but of struggle. Hopefully this struggle can be resolved in negotiation and dialog spaces.
As a result of the analysis presented in this work the questions set in the introduction can now be addressed: How far is the water governance system in Mexico City responsible for a socially unjust distribution and management of the resource? How can civil struggle or conflict help to change governance systems to achieve more socially just results?
In relation to the first question, the argument set in this work is that the water governance system in Mexico City is definitely one of the causes for the prevailing socially unjust distribution and management of water. The current water governance system in the city is still dominated by the decisions of local government officials and to some extent of the private sector. The institutional channels for citizens to participate are far from being structured in a way that could guarantee meaningful participation. This is the first way the system becomes socially unjust in that it does not allow people to take part in the decision-making process that affects a central part of their lives. In practice, as it has been clear in the development of this work, the inhabitants of some of the areas that suffer water scarcity are highly involved and participate, not through institutional channels, but through different protest strategies.
The second way the governance system becomes responsible for a socially unjust distribution of water services is manifested in the fact that the decisions of where and how water is distributed is normally to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable, generally using the explanation of financial and technical limitations. The same neighbourhoods simultaneously suffer the worst service regarding availability, reliability and quality and are the ones that end up turning to water vendors paying much higher prices for their water. This has not only a technical or financial explanation, it is a expression of the power relations prevalent in the city, where people of these neighbourhood, particularly their women, find themselves powerless in front of the other actors defining how water services are managed and distributed.
Water scarcity is a constant theme when discussing the sustainability of Mexico City. Yet as discussed in this work, scarcity is suffered unequally. While citizens in Iztapalapa and other delegaciones suffer water unavailability for months, inhabitants of more affluent neighbourhoods have water uninterruptedly year-round. What is more the scarcity is not suffered equally within households, where normally women are responsible for overcoming the lack of water having to invest hours in fetching it.
The second question where the evidence is much less clear can now be addressed. Although it is appreciable that conflict over water, particularly when it brings together considerable number of citizens to contest the authority, can motivate responses in them to somehow resolve the claims, the solutions are commonly ephemeral. Yet this continuous battle with the authorities has, not only in Mexico but in other Latin-American countries, brought significantly improved water services (Bennett, 1995). Now, the question of whether these conflicts have actually changed the governance system to achieve more socially just results is one step further. The fact that the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF) has created a Special Commission for the Integral Management of Water shows to some extent recognition of the present deficiencies in the governance system. The uncertainty is whether the resulting law modifications will help to improve social justice in water services. Moreover, the question of whether the law will be put in practice is pertinent because there are plenty examples in the country where laws are not practiced.
The need to improve regulation in the water sector of the city is nonetheless evident. The SACM needs to have greater supervision on the private companies work to improve the water service particularly for those who suffer most the scarcity of the resource. Furthermore the role of the delegaciones has to be restudied to be more effective in addressing citizens’ needs and improving efficiency. Moreover the participation channels for citizens involvement in water distribution and management is central for social justice.
According to Martha Delgado, the water sector in Mexico City is crumbling. She admits there are people working to improve the situation; but will it be enough to revert the tendency? We need urgent investment, she emphasises (interview with the author, 3/08/04). Yes, investment is needed, but the way this investment is used will be defined by the power struggles within the governance system. Those who suffer the worst service might fight for an improvement, but how well organised they are – and the honesty of their leaders to avoid co-option – will be crucial to success. Indeed, there are other areas that like Iztapalapa suffer water scarcity, but the combativeness and organisation of this delegación has helped it to be at the centre of attention.
The fact that governance systems do change in time is somewhat encouraging, but how the power relations will evolve is difficult to tell. Will the result of the local water law amendments improve the conditions of some of the poorest in the city? If it is the result of an exercise of wide participation of the different actors, including the most vulnerable, it might to certain extent be a more socially just result. But given the present situation this will most probably be a long process of struggle. Some hard decisions – regarding participation, distribution and management – would be necessary to arrive at a more socially just result. This involves changing power balances which is not something that normally happens as the result of good will but of struggle. Hopefully this struggle can be resolved in negotiation and dialog spaces.
References
ALDF (Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal), 2004, ‘Programa de trabajo. Comisión Especial para la gestión integral del agua’, III Legislatura, Mexico.
Asmal, K, 1998, “Water as a metaphor for governance: issues in the management of water resources in Africa”, Water Policy Volume 1, Issue 1, p. 95-101
Barlow, M. and T. Clarke, 2002, Blue Gold. The Battle Against Corporate Theft of the World’s Water, Earthscan, UK.
Bennett, V., 1995, The Politics of Water. Urban Protest, Gender, and Power in Monterrey, Mexico, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.
Budds, J. and G. McGranahan, 2003, ‘Are the debates on water privatisation missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America’ Environment & Urbanization. Vol 15 No 2
Castro, J.E., 2003‘Urban water and the politics of citizenship: the case of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (1980s-1990s)” Environment and Planning A
Castro, J.E., 2004, “Private sector involvement in water and sanitation services, water governance, and the water poor: some lessons from Latin America, Africa, and Europe”, in N. Laurie (ed.) Geoforum, Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” (forthcoming 2004).
Canak, W and Swanson L., 1998, Modern Mexico, Mc. Graw Hill, USA.
CNA (Comisión Nacional del Agua), 2000, Programa Nacional Hidráulico 2001-2006, CNA, Mexico.
CNA (Comisión Nacional del Agua), 2003, Desafíos para consolidar los Consejos de Cuenca: Nuestra responsabilidad con el presente y el futuro, CNA, SEMARNAT, Segunda reunion nacional de Consejos de Cuenca, Ciudad de Mexico.
Crawley, H., 1998, ‘Living Up to the Empowerment Claim? The Potential of PRA’ in I. Guijt and Shah, M.K. (eds) The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development, Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd, London.
Delgado, M., 2004, ‘Foro de consulta sobre la problemática que enfrentan las delegaciones en la gestión del agua’, 21 de julio de 2004 celebrado en la ALDF, unpublised
De Garay, 1856, ‘Plano General de la Mesa del Valle de Mexico. Con indicación de los canales de desagüe, navegación y riego’ Reduction of the original by M. Castro.
DFID (Department of International Development), 2003 ‘Promoting Institutional & Organisational Development’, Department for International Development, Issues, UK.
Ezcurra E. et al, 1999, The Basin of Mexico. Critical Environmental Issues and Sustainability, United Nations University Press, New York.
Gilbert, A., 1998. The Latin American City. Russell Press, UK.
Harvey D, 1988, Social Justice and the City. Blackell Publishers, Oxford.
Harvey, D., 1992, ‘Social justice, postmodernism and the city’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 16, No. 4, p.588-601.
Healey, P., 1997, Collaborative Planning. Shaping places in Fragmented Societies, MacMillan Press, London.
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática), 2000, ‘XII Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000’, INEGI, México. www.inegi.gob.mx
Kemper, K. and O. Alvarado, 2000, ‘Water’ in Giugale, M et. al. editors, Mexico—A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era, World Bank, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/external/lac/lac.nsf/0/9364AB8A25BABD6085256A4C004B3963?OpenDocument
LAN (Ley de Aguas Nacionales), 2004, ‘Ley de Aguas Nacionales’ First publication in 1992, last modifications 29/04/2004.
Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004, ‘La participación de las delegaciones políticas en la gestión del agua y drenaje del Distrito Federal’ in PUEC, Gestión del agua en el Distrito Federal. Retos y propuestas, UNAM, Mexico.
Martínez Omaña, M. C., 2004, ‘La participación de la empresa privada en la gestión del servicio de agua en el Distrito Federal’, in PUEC, Gestión del agua en el Distrito Federal. Retos y propuestas, UNAM, Mexico.
Martínez-Lagunes and Rodríguez-Tirado, 1998, ‘Water Policies in Mexico’, Water Policy, Vol. 1 pp. 103-114.
Midgley, J., 1997, Social Welfare in Global Context, Sage Publications, USA.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2003 ‘Social Issues in the Provision and Pricing of Water Services’, France.
Ohlsson, L., 2000, ‘Water Conflicts and Social Resource Scarcity’, Phys. Chem. Earth (B), Vol. 25, No.3, pp. 213-220.
Olayo Guadarrama, 2002, ‘Lo que existe en la zona es discriminación: Clara Brugada Llama a huelga de pagos’ La Jornada, 16 April 2002, Mexico, www.jornada.unam.mx
Ramirez Cuevas, 2002, ‘La ciudad tiene sed’ Masiosare, No. 232, La Jornada, 2 June, 2002, Mexico, www.jornada.unam.mx
Sainz Santamaría and Becerra Pérez, 2003, ‘Los conflictos por agua en México: avances de investigación’ Instituto Nacional de Ecología, SEMARNAT, http://www.gob.mx/wb2/egobierno/egob_Los_conflictos_por_agua_en_Mexico
SEDUVI (Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda), 2001, ‘Programa General de Desarrollo del Distrito Federal 2001’. Gaceta Oficial, Mexico.
Schmandt, J. [jschmandt@harc.edu], 2004, ‘Water Demand Management in Arid Regions’ University of Texas at Austin and Houston Advanced Research Center. Paper submitted for International Water Demand Conference (30 of May to 3 June, 2004).
Shiva, V., 2002, Water Wars. Privatization, Pollution and Profit, South End Press, Canada.
Swyngedouw, E., 1995, ‘The contradiction of urban water provision: A study of Guayaquil, Ecuador’, Third World Planning Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 387-405.
Swyngedouw, E., M. Kaïka and E. Castro, 2002, “Urban Water: A political-ecology perspective”, Built Environment, Special Issue on Water Management
in Urban Areas, Vol. 28, #2.
Tortajada, C., 2003, ‘Water Management for a Megacity: Mexico City Metropolitan Area’, Ambio, Vol. 32, No. 2, March 2003, pp. 124-129.
Uitto, J., 1997, ‘Environmental governance and the impeding water crisis’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 7, No. 2.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2004, ‘Water Governance for Poverty Reduction. Key Issues and the UNDP response to Millennium Development Goals’, UNDP, New York, http://www.undp.org/water/pdfs/241456%20UNDP_Guide_Pages.pdf
UN-WWAP (United Nations – World Water Assessment Programme), 2003, Water for People. Water for Life, The United Nations World water Development Report, UNESCO and Berghahn Books.
Ward, C., 1997, Reflected in Water. A Crisis of Social Responsibility, Cassel, Great Britain.
Ward, P., 1986, Welfare Politics in Mexico. Papering over the cracks, The London Research Series in Geography 9, Allen & Unwin Ltd, London.
Ward, P., 1998, Mexico City. John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex.
Warner, M, 2000, Complex Problems Negotiated Solutions: Strategies and Tools for Reducing Conflict as an Obstacle to Sustainable Rural Livelihoods, ITDG.
WB (World Bank), 2004, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, WB, http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2004/
Whiteford and Melville (eds.), 2002, Protecting a Sacred Gift. Water and Social Change in Mexico, Center for US-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, USA.
WHO and UNICEF, 2000, ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals drinking water and sanitation target - A mid-term assessment of progress’, http://www.unicef.org/publications/who_unicef_watsan_midterm_rev.pdf
Winpenny, 2003, ‘Financing water for all’ Report for the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, World Water Council and Global Water Partnership.
Wratten, E., 1995, ‘Conceptualizing urban poverty’, Environment and Urbanisation, Vol. 7 No. 1 April 1995, p. 11-36.
Young I M, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference. Pricenton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
Interviews
Delgado Peralta, Martha Teresa, 3/08/04, Independent Member of Parliament, currently the president of the Special Commission for the Integral Management of Water in the ALDF.
Martínez Santoyo, Arturo Germán, 23/07/04, senior official of the SACM, previously Director General of the CADF.
Asmal, K, 1998, “Water as a metaphor for governance: issues in the management of water resources in Africa”, Water Policy Volume 1, Issue 1, p. 95-101
Barlow, M. and T. Clarke, 2002, Blue Gold. The Battle Against Corporate Theft of the World’s Water, Earthscan, UK.
Bennett, V., 1995, The Politics of Water. Urban Protest, Gender, and Power in Monterrey, Mexico, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.
Budds, J. and G. McGranahan, 2003, ‘Are the debates on water privatisation missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America’ Environment & Urbanization. Vol 15 No 2
Castro, J.E., 2003‘Urban water and the politics of citizenship: the case of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (1980s-1990s)” Environment and Planning A
Castro, J.E., 2004, “Private sector involvement in water and sanitation services, water governance, and the water poor: some lessons from Latin America, Africa, and Europe”, in N. Laurie (ed.) Geoforum, Special Issue on “‘Pro-poor’ water: past present and future scenarios” (forthcoming 2004).
Canak, W and Swanson L., 1998, Modern Mexico, Mc. Graw Hill, USA.
CNA (Comisión Nacional del Agua), 2000, Programa Nacional Hidráulico 2001-2006, CNA, Mexico.
CNA (Comisión Nacional del Agua), 2003, Desafíos para consolidar los Consejos de Cuenca: Nuestra responsabilidad con el presente y el futuro, CNA, SEMARNAT, Segunda reunion nacional de Consejos de Cuenca, Ciudad de Mexico.
Crawley, H., 1998, ‘Living Up to the Empowerment Claim? The Potential of PRA’ in I. Guijt and Shah, M.K. (eds) The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in Participatory Development, Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd, London.
Delgado, M., 2004, ‘Foro de consulta sobre la problemática que enfrentan las delegaciones en la gestión del agua’, 21 de julio de 2004 celebrado en la ALDF, unpublised
De Garay, 1856, ‘Plano General de la Mesa del Valle de Mexico. Con indicación de los canales de desagüe, navegación y riego’ Reduction of the original by M. Castro.
DFID (Department of International Development), 2003 ‘Promoting Institutional & Organisational Development’, Department for International Development, Issues, UK.
Ezcurra E. et al, 1999, The Basin of Mexico. Critical Environmental Issues and Sustainability, United Nations University Press, New York.
Gilbert, A., 1998. The Latin American City. Russell Press, UK.
Harvey D, 1988, Social Justice and the City. Blackell Publishers, Oxford.
Harvey, D., 1992, ‘Social justice, postmodernism and the city’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 16, No. 4, p.588-601.
Healey, P., 1997, Collaborative Planning. Shaping places in Fragmented Societies, MacMillan Press, London.
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática), 2000, ‘XII Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000’, INEGI, México. www.inegi.gob.mx
Kemper, K. and O. Alvarado, 2000, ‘Water’ in Giugale, M et. al. editors, Mexico—A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era, World Bank, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/external/lac/lac.nsf/0/9364AB8A25BABD6085256A4C004B3963?OpenDocument
LAN (Ley de Aguas Nacionales), 2004, ‘Ley de Aguas Nacionales’ First publication in 1992, last modifications 29/04/2004.
Libreros Muñoz and Quiñones Castillo, 2004, ‘La participación de las delegaciones políticas en la gestión del agua y drenaje del Distrito Federal’ in PUEC, Gestión del agua en el Distrito Federal. Retos y propuestas, UNAM, Mexico.
Martínez Omaña, M. C., 2004, ‘La participación de la empresa privada en la gestión del servicio de agua en el Distrito Federal’, in PUEC, Gestión del agua en el Distrito Federal. Retos y propuestas, UNAM, Mexico.
Martínez-Lagunes and Rodríguez-Tirado, 1998, ‘Water Policies in Mexico’, Water Policy, Vol. 1 pp. 103-114.
Midgley, J., 1997, Social Welfare in Global Context, Sage Publications, USA.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2003 ‘Social Issues in the Provision and Pricing of Water Services’, France.
Ohlsson, L., 2000, ‘Water Conflicts and Social Resource Scarcity’, Phys. Chem. Earth (B), Vol. 25, No.3, pp. 213-220.
Olayo Guadarrama, 2002, ‘Lo que existe en la zona es discriminación: Clara Brugada Llama a huelga de pagos’ La Jornada, 16 April 2002, Mexico, www.jornada.unam.mx
Ramirez Cuevas, 2002, ‘La ciudad tiene sed’ Masiosare, No. 232, La Jornada, 2 June, 2002, Mexico, www.jornada.unam.mx
Sainz Santamaría and Becerra Pérez, 2003, ‘Los conflictos por agua en México: avances de investigación’ Instituto Nacional de Ecología, SEMARNAT, http://www.gob.mx/wb2/egobierno/egob_Los_conflictos_por_agua_en_Mexico
SEDUVI (Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda), 2001, ‘Programa General de Desarrollo del Distrito Federal 2001’. Gaceta Oficial, Mexico.
Schmandt, J. [jschmandt@harc.edu], 2004, ‘Water Demand Management in Arid Regions’ University of Texas at Austin and Houston Advanced Research Center. Paper submitted for International Water Demand Conference (30 of May to 3 June, 2004).
Shiva, V., 2002, Water Wars. Privatization, Pollution and Profit, South End Press, Canada.
Swyngedouw, E., 1995, ‘The contradiction of urban water provision: A study of Guayaquil, Ecuador’, Third World Planning Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 387-405.
Swyngedouw, E., M. Kaïka and E. Castro, 2002, “Urban Water: A political-ecology perspective”, Built Environment, Special Issue on Water Management
in Urban Areas, Vol. 28, #2.
Tortajada, C., 2003, ‘Water Management for a Megacity: Mexico City Metropolitan Area’, Ambio, Vol. 32, No. 2, March 2003, pp. 124-129.
Uitto, J., 1997, ‘Environmental governance and the impeding water crisis’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 7, No. 2.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2004, ‘Water Governance for Poverty Reduction. Key Issues and the UNDP response to Millennium Development Goals’, UNDP, New York, http://www.undp.org/water/pdfs/241456%20UNDP_Guide_Pages.pdf
UN-WWAP (United Nations – World Water Assessment Programme), 2003, Water for People. Water for Life, The United Nations World water Development Report, UNESCO and Berghahn Books.
Ward, C., 1997, Reflected in Water. A Crisis of Social Responsibility, Cassel, Great Britain.
Ward, P., 1986, Welfare Politics in Mexico. Papering over the cracks, The London Research Series in Geography 9, Allen & Unwin Ltd, London.
Ward, P., 1998, Mexico City. John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex.
Warner, M, 2000, Complex Problems Negotiated Solutions: Strategies and Tools for Reducing Conflict as an Obstacle to Sustainable Rural Livelihoods, ITDG.
WB (World Bank), 2004, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, WB, http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2004/
Whiteford and Melville (eds.), 2002, Protecting a Sacred Gift. Water and Social Change in Mexico, Center for US-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, USA.
WHO and UNICEF, 2000, ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals drinking water and sanitation target - A mid-term assessment of progress’, http://www.unicef.org/publications/who_unicef_watsan_midterm_rev.pdf
Winpenny, 2003, ‘Financing water for all’ Report for the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, World Water Council and Global Water Partnership.
Wratten, E., 1995, ‘Conceptualizing urban poverty’, Environment and Urbanisation, Vol. 7 No. 1 April 1995, p. 11-36.
Young I M, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference. Pricenton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
Interviews
Delgado Peralta, Martha Teresa, 3/08/04, Independent Member of Parliament, currently the president of the Special Commission for the Integral Management of Water in the ALDF.
Martínez Santoyo, Arturo Germán, 23/07/04, senior official of the SACM, previously Director General of the CADF.